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BREXIT: RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES 
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Introduction
Throughout	most	of	its	decades-long	history,	the	Euro-
pean	Union	has	proved	to	be	an	extremely	strong	and	cri-
sis-resistant	organisation.	 It	stubbornly	survived	all	crises	
thanks	 to	 its	 leaders’	 ability	 and	willingness	 to	 engage	 in	
compromises	 and/or	 ever	 deeper	 integration.	 Since	 the	
outbreak	of	the	global	 financial	crisis,	however,	overcom-
ing	 the	 difficulties	 has	 become	more	 and	more	 difficult.	
Naturally,	when	exploring	 the	origins	of	 these	difficulties	
we	will	find	events	and	developments	both	in	and	outside	
the	EU,	all	having	occurred	or	started	well	before	the	2008	
crisis,	and	having	led,	by	the	early	2000s,	to	a situation	in	
which	solutions	to	the	problems	of	the	European	integra-
tion	could	only	be	found	through	disproportionate	conces-
sions,	 offered	 freely	 or	 under	 pressure	 by	 one	 or	 two	
member	states,	or	even	a small	group	of	them2.	Dissatis-
faction	 associated	 with	 bad	 compromises	 added	 to	 the	
general	 bad	 feelings	 caused	 by	 the	 2008	 crisis	 and	 the	
ensuing	austerity	measures	throughout	Europe.
European	disintegration	can	take	several	forms	ranging	
from	allowing	governments	to	ignore	EU	rules	with	impu-
nity	(e.g.	France	flouting	Eurozone’s	fiscal	rules)	being	the	
mildest,	to	letting	member	states	to	exit	(like	Brexit)	being	
the	wildest3.	Apart	exploring	the	origins	of	the	current	dis-
integration	 tendencies,	 with	 a  special	 regard	 to	 those	 of	
Brexit,	the	purpose	of	this	paper	is	to	map	both	the	risks	
and	the	opportunities	associated	with	these	disintegrative	
tendencies	in	Europe.	For,	as	a hypothesis	of	this	study,	the	
author	presumes	that	in	such	difficult	times,	perceived	by	
many	as	crisis,	 it	 is	not	only	a possibility	to	overcome	the	
problems,	but	also	a must	to	find	out	new	ways	of	thinking,	
and	 proposing	 new	 paths	 of	 development	 in	 order	 to	
minimize	the	risks	and	turn	challenges	into	opportunities.
Roots of disintegration as mirrored in literature
Concerning	the	origins	of	difficulties	in	Europe,	one	can	
mention	 the	 German	 reunification,	 undermining	 the	 for-
we,	elektronika	–	telekomunikacja,	środki	farmaceutyczne,	apara-
tura	naukowo-badawcza,	maszyny	elektryczne,	chemikalia,	maszy-
ny	 nieelektryczne	 oraz	 uzbrojenie.	 Polskie	 nazwy	 kategorii	 dóbr	
wysokiej	techniki	przyjęto	zgodnie	z publikacją	GUS,	Nauka i tech-
nika w 2015 r.	(2016	r.).
2	Na	relację	wydatków	na	badania	i rozwój	do	PKB	składają	się	
wydatki	w czterech	sektorach	–	przedsiębiorstw	(business enterpri-
se sector),	 państwa	 (government sector),	 ośrodków	 akademickich	
(higher education sector)	 i organizacji	non-profit	(private non-profit 
sector).
3	W  latach	 2011-2015	 udział	 produktów	high-tech	 w  polskim	
eksporcie	zwiększył	się	z 5,1%	(24.	miejsce	wśród	krajów	Unii)	do	
8,5%	(19.	miejsce).
4	W latach	2011-2016	import	dóbr	wysokiej	techniki	w krajach	
Unii	Europejskiej	rósł	średnio	3,5%	rocznie,	na	co	złożył	się	wzrost	
handlu	wewnątrz	Unii	o 3,6%	rocznie	oraz	wzrost	importu	z krajów	
trzecich	o 3,4%	 rocznie.	 Prawdopodobnie	wyższa	była	dynamika	
popytu	na	produkty	high-tech	w otoczeniu	UE.	Eksport	zewnętrzny	
krajów	Unii	rósł	w tym	samym	okresie	w tempie	6,0%	rocznie.	
5	 Na	Węgrzech	 obniżeniu	 się	 udziału	 dóbr	wysokiej	 techniki	
w eksporcie	ogółem	towarzyszył	w ostatnich	latach	spadek	znacze-
nia	zagranicznej	wartości	dodanej	w eksporcie	komputerów,	wyro-
bów	elektronicznych	i optycznych.
6	 Wysoka	 dynamika	 eksportu	 sprzętu	 lotniczego	 i  środków	
farmaceutycznych	była	kontynuowana	także	w I kw.	2017	r.	War-
tość	eksportu	w tych	kategoriach	wzrosła	łącznie	o ponad	70%	r/r,	
podczas	 gdy	 w  pozostałych	 kategoriach	 obejmujących	 dobra	
wysokiej	techniki	–	zaledwie	o 5%	r/r.
7	Sprzęt	 lotniczy	 i środki	farmaceutyczne	stanowiły	w 2016	r.	
jedynie	16%	eksportu	dóbr	wysokiej	techniki	i 1,4%	eksportu	ogó-
łem.
8	W eksporcie	UE	najmniejszy	udział	rynków	pozaeuropejskich	
charakteryzuje	sprzedaż	elektroniki	i telekomunikacji	oraz	kompu-
terów	i maszyn	biurowych.	Prawdopodobnie	wynika	to	z faktu,	że	
głównymi	 producentami	 tych	 wyrobów	 w  Unii	 Europejskiej	 są	
korporacje	 spoza	 Europy,	 które	 otworzyły	 tu	 swoje	 filie	 w  celu	
zwiększania	sprzedaży	na	rynki	krajów	europejskich,	a ich	produk-
cja	de facto	zastępuje	import.	Ponadto	w celu	podniesienia	konku-
rencyjności	 tych	 wyrobów	 część	 produkcji	 lokowano	 w  krajach	
Europy	Środkow-Wschodniej,	w celu	obniżenia	kosztów	produkcji.
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mer	balance	of	power	within	 the	 integration;	 the	Eastern	
enlargement,	bringing	in	a  lot	of	relatively	poor	countries	
hence	rendering	decision-making	even	more	difficult	due	
to	increasingly	diverging	interests;	and	the	creation	of	the	
single	currency	which,	by	overlooking	the	need	for	a fiscal	
union,	carried	in	itself	the	germ	of	a core-periphery	rift	in	
the	euro	area4.	As	for	developments	related	not	only	to	the	
European	but	 also	 the	broader	 international	 community,	
the	most	important	change	to	consider	was	the	economic	
paradigm	 shift	 away	 from	 Keynesianism	 and	 postwar	
social	contract	between	business	and	labour	towards	the	
new	concept	of	neoliberalism,	with	extensive	liberalisation,	
privatization	 and	 deregulation,	 tax	 cuts	 favouring	 the	
wealthy	 but	 austerity	 in	 public	 finances,	 all	 emerging	 to	
become	a hotbed	for	growing	imbalances,	inequalities,	and	
anti-elite	hostility.
All	these	developments	–	both	in	and	outside	the	Euro-
pean	Union	–	which	got	even	worse	with	the	global	finan-
cial	crisis	and	the	way	the	crisis	was	handled,	have	led	to	
growing	mistrust	in	politico-economic	elites	and	presented	
a good	opportunity	for	populist	parties	to	consolidate	their	
electorate5.	
Concerning	the	literature,	the	issue	of	disintegration	of	
a  mature,	 formalized	 multilateral	 cooperation	 of	 states	
first	came	up	about	the	Eastern	European	integration,	bet-
ter	known	as	Comecon6	(Roaf	et	al.	2014;	East	and	Pontin,	
2016).	 According	 to	 these	 studies,	 the	 disintegration	 of	
Comecon	has	already	started	well	before	the	collapse	of	its	
institutions.	One	of	the	leading	destructive	factors	was	the	
implementation	of	the	use	of	“hard	currencies”	(practically	
the	USD)	 in	 the	 trade	among	 the	member	states	 in	1991	
(East	and	Pontin,	2016).	Cooper	(1999)	states	that	disinte-
gration	usually	begins	with	a loss	of	legitimacy	of	the	cen-
tral	 authority,	 which	 may	 also	 be	 considered	 as	 a  bad	
omen	for	the	EU,	given	the	declining	trend	of	citizens’	trust	
in	its	institutions	for	the	last	ten	years	or	so,	reflected	in	the	
latest	Eurobarometer	survey	(EC,	2016,	pp.	14-15).
As	for	the	literature	dealing	with	disintegration	tenden-
cies	within	the	European	Union,	the	long-lasting	theoretical	
gridlock	–	based	on	the	standard	approach	(of	Haas,	1970	
and	 others	 like	 Hoffmann,	 1982;	 Marks	 et	 al.,	 1996;	
Pierson,	1996;	and	Radaelli,	2003)	pushing	an	overwhelm-
ing	majority	of	scholars	into	thinking,	as	a matter	of	course,	
that	the	EU	institutions	together	with	those	of	the	member	
states	possess	all	competences	and	capabilities	to	success-
fully	manage	also	 serious	 crises	within	 the	 framework	of	
the	European	integration,	thus	providing	almost	no	clarifi-
cations	for	European	disintegration	–	can	explain	why	only	
some	 very	 few	 single	 papers	 (e.g.	 Vollaard,	 2008;	 Auer,	
2010;	 and	Webber,	 2014)	 have	 dealt	 with	 the	 issue	 until	
recently.	
The	paper	of	Vollaard	(2008)	deserves	special	attention	
due	to	its	comprehensive	approach	to	treating	integration	
and	disintegration	as	being	two	sides	of	the	same	coin,	and	
its	exhaustive	summary	of	 relevant	 literature.	 It	presents	
an	 inventory	of	theories	rooted	 in	different	schools	–	 like	
realism	 (Mearsheimer	 1990),	 federalism	 (Riker,	 1964,	
Franck,	 1968),	 (neo-)	 functionalism	 (Mitrany,	 1966;	 Haas,	
1968),	 transactionalism	 (Deutsch	 et	 al.,	 1957;	 Sandholtz	
and	 Sweet,	 1998)	 or	 communitarianism	 (Etzioni,	 2001)	 –	
and	explains	that	all	of	them	suffer	from	a territorial	bias	
by	taking	the	state	for	granted	as	the	necessary	outcome	
of	disintegration,	or,	in	other	words,	the	only	option	in	case	
integration	 fails.	 After	 drawing	 lessons	 from	 theories	 on	
decline	and	fall	of	past	empires	–	e.g.	that	disintegration	of	
the	EU	may	not	only	stem	from	internal	weaknesses	(like	
inability	to	control	its	periphery)	but	also	from	the	strength	
of	external	players	to	attract	capital	–	and	devoting	a whole	
chapter	 to	 Rokkan’s	 ideas7	 on	 polity-	 (re)formation	 (Rok-
kan,	1999),	Vollaard	tries	to	offer	a synthesis	of	some	(then)	
more	 recent	 research	 (e.g.	 Maier,	 2002;	 Caporaso	 and	
Jupille,	 2004;	 Bartolini,	 2005).	 He	 concludes	 that	 the	 pat-
terns	 of	 integration	 and	 disintegration	 being	 not	 evenly	
distributed	across	the	EU,	 it	seems	unlikely	the	European	
Union	would,	at	 least	 in	 the	foreseeable	future,	 fall	apart	
into	Westphalian	states	again.	
Auer	 (2010)	 argues	 that	 the	 attempt	 to	 continue	with	
the	 integration	process	 as	 before	 –	 i.e.	 to	move	 towards	
a more	federalist	Europe	with	a “post-national	citizenship”	
à	la	Habermas	(2001)	–	is	no	longer	feasible.	He	states	that	
populism	 and	 ethno-centric	 nationalism	 are	 emerging	 in	
Europe	 not despite	 but	 arguably	 in response	 to	 its	 elites’	
cosmopolitan	 agenda.	 Likewise,	 unrealistic	 expectations	
about	Europe’s	future	may	even	contribute	to	the	demise	
of	the	whole	integration	project.	Auer	calls	for	more	real-
ism	in	facing	the	challenge	of	growing	nationalism,	which	
would	help	both	to	better	understand	the	European	inte-
gration	 and	 address	 the	 appeal	 of	 populist	 politics.	 He	
advises	 to	 look	 at	 the	 heterogeneity	 and	 diversity	 of	 the	
(enlarged)	Europe	as	an	opportunity	to	seize,	rather	than	
a burden	to	overcome.
Finally,	Webber	(2014),	by	assessing	whether	the	exist-
ing	 integration	 theories	 could	 predict	 under	 what	 condi-
tions	the	EU	might	disintegrate,	suggests	that	the	future	of	
the	European	Union	 is	more	 contingent	upon	 the	 rise	of	
anti-European	 movements,	 as	 well	 as	 on	 Germany’s	
engagement	 than	most	 such	 theories	 allow.	 The	 unified	
and	 economically	 resurgent	Germany	 aims,	 for	 domestic	
policy	reasons	related	to	the	sustainability	of	its	traditional	
role	as	a regional	paymaster,	 to	restrict	 the	autonomy	of	
supranational	organs	and	favours	intergovernmental	deci-
sion-making	in	order	to	preserve	a veto	on	key	issues,	inter 
alia	making	sure	that	the	Eurozone	is	managed	according	
to	its	priorities8.	To	the	extent,	however,	that	Berlin	tries	to	
assert	 its	 influence	 over	 EU	 policy,	 resentments	 against	
Germany	may	 increase	 in	other	member	states	which,	 in	
turn,	risks	strengthening	anti-European	forces.	
Antecedents and origins of Brexit
A significant	part	of	the	British	elite	–	raised	on	imperial	
tradition	with	a global	mindset	and	with	attitudes	deeply	
rooted	 in	 their	 specific	 political	 culture	 –	 could	 never	
embrace	European	integration	wholeheartedly,	or	confine	
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their	 ambitions	 to	 the	 pursuit	 of	 regional	 interests.	 The	
British	have	always	been	leading	advocates	of	free	trade;	in	
case	 the	 European	 cooperation	 exceeded	 this	 level,	 they	
either	 skipped	 it	 (e.g.	 Eurozone	 or	 Schengen)	 or	 tried	 to	
slow	it	down	(e.g.	in	common	budget	or	social	and	employ-
ment	policy	matters).	
Indeed, one of British businesses’ principal objectives 
with EU membership was to extend the UK’s liberalised 
model of capitalism into the European Union with the 
intention of open up new markets, especially before the 
country’s large companies and financial services indus-
try. In other fields, the British business relied upon the 
UK government’s capacity to defend the country’s 
deregulated markets and shape EU policies in line with 
its vested interest – e.g. by limiting the supranational 
up-regulation of labour standards (Lavery,	2017). 
When	the	UK	entered,	the	European	integration	already	
had	 had	 its	 own	 institutional	 arrangement,	 several	 com-
mon	 policies,	 e.g.	 common	 commercial	 and	 agricultural	
policies,	the	regulations	of	which	had	been	elaborated	and	
codified	 ignoring	 British	 interests	 completely.	 It	 soon	
became	 clear	 that	 the	 country	 could	 only	 continue	 its	
membership	 if	 granted	 special,	 exceptional	 rights	 in	 sev-
eral	 areas.	 Accordingly,	 although	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 is	
not	 the	 only	 country	 where	 EU	 legislation	 applies	 selec-
tively,	with	opt-out	rights	in	four	key	areas	–	i.e.	not	having	
to	take	part	in	the	third	phase	of	the	EMU	(i.e.	introducing	
the	euro),	as	well	as	in	the	Schengen	Cooperation;	gaining	
dispensation	 from	 some	 parts	 of	 the	 Charter	 of	 Funda-
mental	Rights	(in	particular	regarding	labour,	family,	health,	
environment,	and	consumer	protection	issues);	finally,	the	
fourth	opt-out	concerning	justice	and	home	affairs	of	the	
Treaty	of	Lisbon	–	the	UK	has	been	the	member	state	with	
the	most	 exemptions	 in	 the	EU	 (Somai	 and	Biedermann,	
2016).
As	 for	 the	 deeper	 societal	 and	 economic	 reasons	
behind	 the	British	 choice	of	 leaving	 the	European	Union,	
let	us	recall	here	four	of	them.
The	first	one	relates	to	UK’s	excessive	net	contribution	
to	the	EU	budget,	caused	by	both	the	country	receiving	too	
little	sources	from	the	common	funds	and	having	to	con-
tribute	too	much	to	them.	This	situation	had,	for	more	than	
twenty	 years,	 been	 mitigated	 by	 the	 rebate	 secured	 by	
Margaret	Thatcher	at	 the	Fontainebleau	Summit	 in	1984,	
but	 started	 to	 deteriorate	 again	 (Figure	 1)	 following	 the	
decision	of	the	Blair	cabinet	–	at	the	December	2005	Sum-
mit	 closing	 the	 negotiations	 on	 the	multiannual	 financial	
framework	(MFF)	for	the	period	2007-13	–	to	cede	a signifi-
cant	part	of	the	rebate	in	order	the	British	take	their	due	
part	in	the	burden	of	Eastern	enlargement.	
Figure 1
UK’s operating/total balance in EU budget (euro million)
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Note: Operating budgetary balance does not take into account either administrative costs on the expenditure side, or traditional own resources 
(mainly customs duties) on the revenue side. As both administrative costs and the so-called Rotterdam effect are insignificant for the UK, it is 
relevant to calculate the total balance, too. 
Source: own calculations based on ”EU expenditure and revenue 2014-2020” - http://ec.europa.eu/budget/figures/interactive/index_en.cfm 
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The	third	factor	to	be	considered	here	was	the	gradual	
shift	 in	 balance	 of	 power	 in	 Europe	 since	 the	 German	
reunification	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 1980s.	 The	 British	 have	
always	been	interested	in	membership	until	a certain	bal-
ance	of	power	could	be	maintained,	with	Paris	and	Bonn/
Berlin	being	the	main	engines	of	the	integration	and	Lon-
don	playing	 its	 traditional	 role	 to	keep	these	powers	bal-
anced.	 The	 fact	 that	 Germany	 emerged	 from	 the	 global	
crisis	 even	 stronger	 and	 the	 balance	 of	 power	 between	
Paris	 and	Berlin	 seemed	 to	have	been	 lost	 for	 long,	was	
one	 of	 the	 main	 factors	 contributing	 to	 pushing	 Britain	
towards	Brexit.	As	responses	 to	 the	Eurozone	crisis	were	
At	the	mathematical	level	(i.e.	comparing	data	for	2004-
2009	and	2010-2015),	 the	effect	of	partial	 renouncement	
on	 rebate	 resulted	 in	 a  deterioration	 of	 approximately	 
5	billion	euro	in	the	British	net	budgetary	position	due	to	
the	Eastern	enlargement.	The	British	(together	with	France)	
became	the	second-third	most	important	net	contributors	
of	the	EU	after	Germany	–	second	with	a great	difference	if	
we	 take	 into	 account	 the	 customs	 payments	 (European	
Commission,	2016).
The	 second	 reason	 behind	 Brexit	 was	 immigration	 
(Figure	2).	While	the	effects	of	inward	and	outward	migra-
tion	 flows	 more	 or	 less	 offset	 each	 other	 in	 the	 United	
Kingdom	during	most	of	the	20th	century,	the	number	of	
people	migrating	to	the	UK	has,	since	the	early	1990s,	con-
stantly	 surpassed	 that	 of	 emigrants.	 Immigration	 gained	
further	 momentum	 after	 the	 Eastern	 enlargement,	 net	
immigration	 reaching	 200	 thousand	 regularly	 every	 year	
since	 2004,	 and	 even	 300	 thousand	 between	 December	
2014	 and	 June	 2016	 –	 based	 on	 data	 of	 the	 last	 twelve	
months	 (Hawkins,	 2016,	pp.	 9-10)9. What	made	 the	mas-
sive	inflow	of	people	from	new	member	states	even	worse	
was	that	they	took	on	jobs	at	significantly	lower	wage	levels	
than	 local	people	or	 those	coming	 from	the	old	member	
states.	The	Eastern	enlargement	has	largely	added	to	the	
number	 of	 those	 low-skilled,	 low-waged	 workers	 whose	
bulk	had	arrived	earlier	to	the	UK	from	the	Indian	subcon-
tinent.	Mass	migration	 from	new	member	states	has	not	
only	had	a negative	impact	on	average	UK	wages,	but	has	
also	 certainly	 (regionally	 and	 depending	 on	 occupational	
groups)	displaced	local	nationals	from	their	jobs.	The	latter	
were	 replaced	 by	 Eastern	 European	 migrants	 willing	 to	
work	either	for	lower	pay	or	under	inferior	conditions	than	
British	natives	(Conway,	2014,	pp.	70).
Figure 2
Non-UK nationals working in the UK
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European debt crisis + 
Viktor Orbán becomes 
Prime Minister of Hungary 
Free movement 
from RO (and BG) 
Note: After Eastern enlargement a great wave of Polish people migrated to the UK. In 2015, Poland overtook India as the most common non-UK 
country of birth leaving in the UK (916,000). The number of people arriving from Romania is growing very fast. In 2013, there were 94,000 
Romanians in the UK, in 2015 their number reached 223,000 and this country ranked first (with 182,000) as for its NINo (National Insurance 
number) registrations for the year ending March 2017 registrations. 
Source: Office for National Statistics, UK labour market: 2017 March https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/
employmentandemployeetypes/bulletins/uklabourmarket/mar2017 
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designed	 to	 fit	 into	 German	 economic	 policy	 standards	
(ever	closer	union,	ever	more	austerity),	London	started	to	
face	 increasing	 pressure	 either	 to	 join	 the	 Eurozone	 in	
order	 to	 influence	decision-making,	or	 leave	the	EU	com-
pletely	(Conway,	2014).	But	the	first	option	was	not	real	as	
a significant	part	of	 the	British	elite	was	always	viscerally	
rejecting	the	vision	of	such	extreme	pooling	of	sovereignty,	
and	especially	“being	bossed	by”	Germans	dominating	the	
integration	(Lawson,	1990).
The	fourth	factor	leading	to	Brexit	finds	its	roots	in	Brit-
ish	political	culture	whose	fundamental	principle	since	the	
Civil	War	has	been	the	repudiation	of	absolutism;	absolut-
ism	in	the	sense	of	ruling	by	decree,	i.e.	with	the	sovereign	
decreeing	the	law	without	having	to	discuss	it	with	Parlia-
ment.	While	 the	 law-making	activities	of	 the	Commission	
are	viewed	with	distrust	 in	Britain,	continental	Europeans	
view	them	as	nothing	more	than	an	extension	of	the	nor-
mal	doings	performed	by	national	bureaucrats	to	the	com-
munity	 level.	The	British	people’s	adherence	 to	 the	 tradi-
tion	 of	 democratic	 accountability	was	 probably	 the	most	
important	argument	against	the	maintenance	of	member-
ship	 in	 an	ever	more	 integrated	European	Union	 (James,	
2016).
Finally,	one	can	add	a general	factor	behind	the	Brexit	
vote	 which	 stemmed	 from	 the	 increase	 of	 income	 and	
wealth	 inequalities.	 As	 globalisation	 reached	 the	 average	
British	 citizens,	 the	 production	 of	 goods	 they	 consumed	
shifted	to	a foreign	country	if	manufacturing	was	cheaper	
there,	and	if	 they	complained	about	 it	or	did	not	want	to	
take	 low-paid	 jobs,	 they	 were	 easy	 to	 be	 replaced	 with	
someone	 from	 abroad.	 The	 free	 outward	 movement	 of	
capital	and	inward	movement	of	labour	both	hit	the	aver-
age	British	citizens.	The	way	the	UK	government	(similarly	
to	 those	 in	most	other	developed	countries)	handled	 the	
global	 financial	 crisis	 –	 i.e.	 placing	 the	 burden	 of	 conse-
quences	on	 the	society	as	a whole,	 rather	 than	on	 those	
responsible	 –	 has	 not	 only	 further	 increased	 income,	
wealth	 (and	opportunity)	 inequalities,	but	has	also	 led	 to	
widespread	anti-elite	 sentiments.	 The	 referendum	on	EU	
membership	 was	 far	 from	 the	 mere	 technical	 issue	 of	
whether	staying	or	leaving	the	integration.	To	most	British	
citizens	it	was	a desperate	and	legitimate	answer	to	British	
and	 European	 (especially	 Brussels)	 elite	 politics	 that	 had	
discredited	themselves.	Will	the	elite	learn	from	the	result,	
will	they	reach	a reasonable	conclusion?	The	problem	they	
are	 in	 is	 a  Catch	 22	 situation:	 a  hard	Brexit	means	 even	
more	suffering	for	both	the	UK	and	the	EU,	but	a soft	one	
could	 be	 seen	 by	 them	 as	 a  “dangerous”	 precedent	 for	
leaving	the	integration	“unpunished”	and	thus	trigger	a dis-
integration	of	the	remaining	EU.
Risks and opportunities
Since	 the	day	of	Brexit	 referendum	 in	 June	2016,	 it	 is	
obvious	and	clear	that,	for	the	first	time	in	post-war	Europe	
such	a highly	 coordinated	system	based	on	 international	
cooperation	as	the	EU	is,	will	certainly	have	to	suffer	a cer-
tain	degree	of	disintegration.	The	European	disintegration	
is	 unquestionably	 underway	 and	 those	 socio-economic	
processes	in	and	outside	Europe	that	strengthen	it,	will,	at	
least	 in	 the	medium-term,	 continue	 to	 run. Other	world-
wide	current	processes	like	anti-globalism,	economic	patri-
otism	and	protectionism	are,	however,	mingling	with	(core)	
EU	elites’	desire	to	strengthen	European	cooperation	and	
institutions,	which	thus	makes	the	EU	swinging	like	a yoyo	
between	disintegration	and	ever	further	integration.	Brief-
ly,	as	all	these	events	are	of	a rather	uncertain	and	unpre-
dictable	character,	also	Brexit	being	a moving	target,	one	
has	to	recognize	that	it	is	impossible	to	predict	how	the	EU	
might	 disintegrate	 and/or	 further	 integrate	 in	 the	 near	
future.	
Now,	what	is	not	only	possible,	but	also	useful	to	do,	is	
to	consider	both	the	risks	and	opportunities	of	the	disinte-
grative	process	of	Brexit.	
Risks
The	most	 significant	 risk	associated	with	Brexit	 lies	 in	
the	potential	overestimating	by	negotiators	of	both	sides	
of	 their	 perceived	 political	 interests	 and	 placing	 them	
before	real	social	and	economic	 interests	of	 the	country/
countries	they	represent.	Especially,	on	the	EU	side	there	is	
an	enormous	risk	to	treat	the	Britons	as	treators	and	even	
idiots	 for	 their	 decision	 to	 leave,	 and	 who	 therefore	
deserve	 to	 be	 humiliated	 and	 punished10.	 It	 was	 small	
wonder	that	the	first	signs	of	such	approach	–	being	at	the	
same	 time	hostile	and	 condescending,	 expressed	 in	high	
officials’	statements	 in	Brussels	and	member	states’	capi-
tals	 –	 did	 trigger	 similar	 reactions	 from	 the	 other	 side11.	
The	point	is	that	negotiations,	if	conducted	in	such	strained	
ambiance,	may	easily	be	derailed	and	result	in	a cliff	edge	
in	2019,	causing	enormous	damage	to	the	sectors	exposed	
to	 international	 co-operation	 (like	 aviation,	 car	 industry,	
pharmaceutics	or	financial	services)	both	in	the	EU	and	the	
UK.
Of	course,	one	cannot	 forget	 that	 there	 is	 life	beyond	
the	 world	 of	 big	 business,	 too.	 There	 are	 lots	 of	 micro,	
small	and	medium-sized	enterprises	in	Britain,	not	having	
too	many	international	connections,	but	employing	notice-
ably	more	people	 than	big	businesses	do12.	Perhaps,	 the	
Brexit	vote	was	partly	due	to	the	fact	that	too	much	atten-
tion	had	been	paid	 to	big	businesses.	At	 least,	 economic	
policy,	laws	and	regulations	had	increasingly	been	tailored	
to	 favour	 them,	while	 smaller	 businesses	 and	 a  growing	
part	of	the	population	were	having	a feeling	of	being	com-
pletely	abandoned13.	
With	 a  view	 to	 properly	 assessing	 the	 risks	 of	 a  cliff-
edge	 Brexit,	 let	 us	 consider	 two	 sectoral	 examples.	 The	
first	 one	 relates	 to	 the	 automotive	 industry,	 one	 of	 the	
most	 globally	 organised	 sectors	 of	 the	 British	 economy.	
While	 producing	 around	 1%	 of	 the	 country’s	 gross	 value	
added,	and	employing	0.5%	of	total	workforce,	it	accounts	
for	12%	of	total	UK	exports	of	goods,	and	invests	2.5	billion	
pounds	 in	R&D	 (2015	data).	 Should,	 in	 case	of	 a no	deal	
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scenario,	the	UK	withdrawal	from	the	EU	result	in	the	intro-
duction	of	WTO	tariffs	(i.e.	EU	bound	mfn	tariffs	specified	
at	the	WTO:	10%	for	cars,	2.5-4.5%	for	parts)	in	UK-EU	bilat-
eral	 trade,	 the	 associated	 customs	 checks,	 alone	 costing	
100-150	euro,	would	cause	significant	delays	in	delivery	in	
an	 industry	 operating	 both	 lean	 and	 just-in-time	 proce-
dures.	Non-tariffs	barriers	such	as	administrative	burdens	
and	 compliance	 costs	would	 add,	 as	 a  conservative	 esti-
mate,	a further	6%	to	the	costs	(SMMT	2016).	
Naturally,	 all	 these	 negative	 consequences	 could	 be	
avoided	if	negotiations	are	guided	by	mutual	goodwill.	This	
would	be	all	the	more	logical	and	mutually	advantageous	
for	the	UK	and	the	EU	as	the	automotive	 industry,	unlike	
other	ones,	 “can	only	 take	 (re-)location	decisions	once	 in	
the	7-year	 life-cycle	of	a new	product”	 (PwC,	2016).	So,	 in	
the	 absence	 of	 a  comprehensive	 free	 trade	 deal,	 only	
a sector-specific	agreement	(e.g.	by	converting	production	
sites	into	customs	free	zones)	could	shield	the	car	industry	
from	 uncertainty	 and	 make	 sure	 the	 investment	 cycle	
remains	unbroken.	
The	other	sectoral	example	is	that	of	financial	services,	
an	 industry	 which	 constitutes	 7%	 of	 UK	 GDP,	 employing	
directly	1.1	million	people.	When	related	professional	ser-
vices	 –	 management	 consultancy,	 legal	 services	 and	
accounting	 services	 –	 are	 added,	 these	 figures	 go	 up	 to	
11.8%	of	GDP	and	2.18	million	for	the	workforce,	so	a 7.4%	
contribution	 to	UK	employment	 (TheCityUK,	2016).	These	
services	together	generate	a trade	surplus	of	over	70	bil-
lion	 pounds.	 From	 their	 annual	 turnover	 of	 around	 200	
billion	 pounds	 45-48%	 relates	 to	 domestic	 business,	
20-25%	to	the	EU,	and	the	rest	to	rest	of	the	world.	They	
pay	over	60	billion	pounds	a year	 in	tax,	half	of	which	as	
employees’	 income	 tax	 and	 national	 insurance	 contribu-
tions	(House	of	Lords,	2016a).	
Naturally,	a key	risk	for	the	sector	relates	to	the	uncer-
tainty	about	how	much	access	to	the	Single	Market	the	UK	
will	 manage	 to	 keep.	 In	 the	 absence	 of	 clarity,	 financial	
institutions	will	restructure	and/or	relocate	on	the	basis	of	
a worst	case	scenario.	And,	as	this	would	involve	the	move	
of	several	thousands	of	jobs	from	London	to	such	financial	
hotspots	like	Paris,	Dublin	or	Frankfurt,	not	only	part	of	the	
activity	will	be	lost	for	the	UK,	but	also	the	related	tax	rev-
enues	(House	of	Lords,	2016b).	
From	the	UK	point	of	view,	the	two	key	arrangements	
to	be	preserved	are	the	passport	for	the	single	market	and	
the	clearing	and	settlement	in	the	euro.	
The	EU	passport	–	 this	mechanism	permitting	compa-
nies	based	and	 regulated	 in	one	EU	member	state	 to	do	
business	 in	the	others	–	matters	more	to	some	trunks	of	
the	financial	services	industry	(e.g.	to	retail	banking,	insur-
ance	and	investment	services)	than	others.	As	this	mecha-
nism	works	only	for	those	within	the	Single	Market,	and,	as	
things	 stand	 today,	 the	UK	will	not	 remain	 in	 there,	 Lon-
don-based	business	will	 have	 to	 establish	 subsidiaries	 in	
another	EU	member	state	in	order	to	have	passport	rights.	
But	 this	 would	 be	 inefficient	 because	 of	 the	 increasing	
regulatory	complexity	and	the	requirement	for	the	banks	
to	 put	 additional	 liquidity	 behind	 the	 businesses	 (Ford,	
2017).	
The	 same	 holds	 true	 for	 other	 main	 issue:	 should	
Brussels	attempt	 to	re-patriate	euro-denominated	clear-
ing	 to	 the	 Eurozone,	 depriving	 the	 UK	 of	 tens	 of	 thou-
sands	of	 jobs,	 it	would	cost	banks	and	 investors	 tens	of	
thousands	 of	 billions	 of	 euros	 over	 a  5-year	 period,	 so	
a  no-win	 situation	 for	 both	 sides14.	 It	 is	 so	 because	
unpicking	a highly	developed	ecosystem	as	the	City	is	has	
its	price.	The	City	of	London	has	developed	 for	decades	
into	what	it	is	today:	the	world’s	leading	financial	centre,	
regrouping	hundreds	of	banks	and	thousands	of	all	sort	
of	 financial	 services	providers	 in	 an	environment	where	
all,	packaged	 together	and	 interconnected	 to	 the	extent	
that	businesses	get	 real	 scale	of	capital,	 skills	and	 infra-
structure,	 in	 brief,	 enjoy	 the	 benefits	 of	 economies	 of	
scale	 (compare	 the	 statement	 of	 Wilmot-Sitwell,	 EMEA	
President,	Bank	of	America	Merrill	 Lynch	 Int,	one	of	 the	
witnesses	at	an	inquiry	on	“Brexit	and	financial	services	in	
the	UK”	held	on	14	September	2016	in	the	House	of	Lords	
Select	 Committee	 on	 the	 EU	 Financial	 Affairs	 Sub-Com-
mittee	(House	of	Lords,	2016c)).	
The	 difficulties	 associated	 with	 replicating,	 at	 least	 in	
the	short	term,	the	services	currently	provided	in	the	UK	–	
and	the	assumption	that	much	of	the	business	lost	by	the	
UK	 would	 be	 more	 likely	 to	 relocate	 to	 New	 York,	 the	
world’s	 second	 financial	 centre,	 than	 to	elsewhere	 in	 the	
EU	 –	 suggest	 that	 it	 would	 not	 be	 in	 the	 EU’s	 economic	
interest	for	these	services	to	be	provided	less	efficiently	in	
a smaller	European	financial	centre	or	in	New	York	instead	
of	 London	 (House	 of	 Lords,	 2016a).	 So,	 perhaps	 for	 the	
sake	 of	 both	 parties,	 better	 would	 be	 to	 move	 towards	
globalisation,	in	a sense	of	accepting	that	it	is	a global	busi-
ness,	 and	 relying	 to	 more	 and	 more	 globally	 regulated	
equivalence	regimes15.	
Opportunities
Table	1	presents	an	overview	of	 the	main	 topics	 con-
cerning	both	the	UK	and	the	EU27.
In	this	paper,	two	of	the	above	challenges	and	opportu-
nities	are	treated	in	detail.	Let	us	first	see	what	will	be	the	
implications	of	Brexit	for	the	Union.	Based	on	Prime	Minis-
ter	Theresa	May’s	speech	on	the	subject	made	at	Lancaster	
House	on	17th	January	2017,	in	which	she	emphasized	the	
need	for	preservation	of	the	“precious	Union”,	that	of	the	
“great	 union	 of	 nations”	making	 up	 the	 United	 Kingdom	
(May	 2017),	 the	 so-called	White	 Paper	 of	 the	UK	 govern-
ment	set	out	12	guiding	principles,	of	which	“Strengthening	
the	Union”,	about	their	new	strategy	forging	the	country’s	
new	partnership	with	the	EU.	
In	 theory,	 as	 responsibility	 for	 international	 relations,	
negotiations	with	the	EU	included,	lies	with	the	UK	govern-
ment,	Westminster	might	have	sought	to	impose	a Brexit	
deal	without	much	involving	the	devolved	administrations.	
But	this	would	have	broken	with	the	tradition	of	‘legislative	
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consent	 convention’	 under	 which	 the	 UK	 government	
seeks	consultations	in	order	to	reach	devolved	agreement	
before	legislating	(Paun,	2016).	So,	a Joint	Ministerial	Com-
mittee	has	been	established	bringing	 together	 leaders	of	
the	devolved	administrations	of	Scotland,	Wales,	Northern	
Ireland,	 to	meet	 on	 a monthly	 basis,	 to	 understand	 and	
consider	each	administration’s	priorities,	and	to	contribute	
to	the	process	of	planning	of	Brexit.
Table 1
Challenges and opportunities related to Brexit: implications for the UK and the EU27 
UK EU27
- Maintenance	 of	 the	 Union	 with	 Scotland,	 Wales	 and	 Northern	
Ireland;
- Maintenance	of	CTA;
- Foreign	policy	matters;
- Social	policy/fairer	society;
- Trade	with	the	EU	and	third	parties;
- Common	 policies	 becoming	 national	 ones	 (commercial,	 CAP,	
cohesion,	R&D);
- Access	 to	 the	 Single	Market	 (financial	 services	 and	 automotive	
industry	included).
- Further	shift	 in	balance	of	power	 (Germany/France/the	 funding	
Six);
- Member	States’	stances	in	a post-Brexit	EU;	
- Future	of	EU	common	budget	(own	resources	and	expenditure,	
rebate	and	rebates	of	the	rebate);
- Future	of	other	common	policies	(CAP	and	others);
- EU-UK	relationship	(trade,	investments,	citizens’	rights);
- Deepening	versus	multi-speed	or	multi-tier	EU.
Source: Own compilation based on the White Paper (HM Government, 2017) and the webpage of EU Taskforce on Article 50 negotiations with the UK 
(https://ec.europa.eu/info/departments/taskforce-article-50-negotiations-united-kingdom_en) 
However,	as	 there	 is	an	evident	conflict	between	May	
government’s	stance	of	leaving	both	the	EU	Single	Market	
and	Customs	Union	and	that	of	the	devolved	administra-
tions	to	remain	in	them,	there	is	a risk	of	growing	tension	
triggering	 political	 deadlock,	 legal	 battles	 or,	 ultimately,	
even	the	possible	breakup	of	the	UK.	If	this	risk	cannot	be	
considered	as	 too	high,	 it	 is	 because,	 firstly,	 Scotland	 (or	
Northern	Ireland)	has	almost	no	chance	to	keep	EU	mem-
bership	if	Britain	leaves,	as	several	member	states	(notably	
Spain)	worry	about	secessionist	trends	and	are	unlikely	to	
encourage	or	agree	to	such	a precedent	of	swift	accession	
of	a successor	state	to	the	EU	in	case	the	UK	disintegrates.	
Secondly,	as	devolved	regions’	exports	to	the	rest	of	the	UK	
are	estimated	to	be	several	times	greater	than	those	to	the	
EU27,	 it	deters	 them	to	put	at	risk	 their	relationship	with	
the	UK	(UK	Government	2017:19).	
Viewing	 from	 a  more	 positive	 angle,	 Brexit	 could	 be	
seen	as	an	opportunity	for	strengthening	intergovernmen-
tal	 collaboration	between	Westminster	 and	 the	devolved	
administrations,	 rather	 than	 driving	 the	 Union	 apart.	
Accordingly,	in	its	White	Paper	the	UK	government	hastens	
to	 commit	 that	 no	 decisions	 will	 be	 removed	 from	 the	
devolved	administration	and	when	it	will	be	about	to	repat-
riate	 competences	 from	 Brussels,	 the	 opportunity	 of	
ensuring	power	 sits	 closer	 to	 the	people	will	 be	used	by	
making	sure	that	more	decisions	are	devolved	(UK	Govern-
ment	2017:18).	
The	other	big	issue	to	be	addressed	here	is	the	problem	
of	how	to	ensure	the	continuation	of	 free	trade	between	
the	UK	and	the	EU.	While	the	White	Paper	 insists	on	that	
UK	 new	 partnership	 with	 the	 EU	 should	 allow	 tariff-free	
trade	in	both	goods	and	services	as	freest	and	frictionless	
as	possible,	there	are	growing	doubts	about	whether	this	
goal	could	be	achieved.	The	UK	government,	by	way	of	the	
Prime	 Minister’s	 speech	 in	 January	 2017	 and	 the	 White	
Paper	which	followed	in	February,	have	rejected	two	of	the	
broad	frameworks	considered	by	many	experts	as	options:	
the	one	 that	 the	UK	 remains	 in	 the	Single	Market	 (called	
the	Norway	option),	and	the	other	 that	 the	country	stays	
within	the	EU	customs	union.	By	these	developments	the	
range	of	formal	options	and	negotiating	priorities	has	been	
restricted	to	what	the	White	Paper	calls	a “bold	and	ambi-
tious”	 or	 an	 “ambitious	 and	 comprehensive”	 free	 trade	
agreement	 (FTA)	and	a  “mutually	beneficial	new	customs	
agreement	with	the	EU”	(UK	Government,	2017,	pp.	7,	35).
It	 is,	however,	quite	clear	that	the	existing	FTAs	of	the	
EU,	 including	 the	 Comprehensive	 Economic	 and	 Trade	
Agreement	(known	as	CETA)	recently	concluded	with	Can-
ada,	do	not	provide	anything	like	as	comprehensive	access	
to	the	European	Single	Market	for	businesses	as	member-
ship	of	that	single	market	as	such	would	entail.	Also,	there	
are	 great	 complications	 in	 the	 services	 trade	 that	 most	
FTAs	do	not	 in	any	detail	 cover.	 Finally,	while	addressing	
tariff	barriers	within	an	FTA	could	be	relatively	straightfor-
ward,	notwithstanding	the	short	timescale	to	negotiate	an	
agreement,	 but	 replicating	 the	 prohibition	 of	 non-tariff	
barriers	 to	trade	while	outside	the	customs	union	will	be	
more	of	a challenge.	This	includes	compliance	with	rules	of	
origin,	regulations	and	standards.	Not	to	mention	the	issue	
of	 leaving	 the	customs	union	generates	costs	and	delays	
resulting	from	customs	procedures	and	any	added	admin-
istrative	burdens	(House	of	Lords	Hansard,	2017).
However,	 there	 are	 good	 reasons	 to	 believe	 that	 it	 is	
possible	to	reach	a good	deal,	an	economically	rational	FTA	
that	both	Britain	and	the	EU	should	aim	for.	Perhaps,	the	
EU	should	a bit	even	more	than	the	UK,	as	the	Community	
has,	 in	 recent	years,	developed	a considerable	 trade	sur-
plus	vis-à-vis	its	partner	(Figure	3).	
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According	to	mainstream	theories,	trade	is	not	a zero-
sum	game:	more	of	it	makes	us	all	more	prosperous.	Free	
trade	 between	 Britain	 and	 the	 European	 Union	 means	
more	trade,	and	more	trade	means	more	 jobs	and	more	
wealth	 creation.	 The	 erection	 of	 new	 barriers	 to	 trade,	
meanwhile,	would	mean	the	reverse:	less	trade,	fewer	jobs	
and	lower	growth.	It	seems,	however,	these	theories	forget	
an	important	fact:	so	long	as	capital	can	flow	freely,	capital	
owners	invest	where	they	can	obtain	the	best	mix	of	qual-
ity	and	cost,	i.e.	in	sites	with	optimal	conditions	(like	China).	
As	general	trade	facilitation	since	WW2	and	the	prolifera-
tion	of	bi-	and	multilateral,	regional	and	global	trade	agree-
ments	 have	 brought	 (especially	 industrial)	 tariffs	 down	
considerably,	even	ordinary	low-price	products	can	profit-
ably	be	transported	from	great	distance.	The	result	is	that	
although	people	as	customers	might	gain	a bit	by	acquiring	
goods	cheaper	from	low-cost	countries	than	from	national	
manufacturers,	 however,	 as	 employees,	 they	 can	 easily	
(the	 less	 skilled	 they	 are,	 the	more	 easily	 they	 can)	 lose	
their	jobs,	or	at	least	their	livelihood	can	become	increas-
ingly	precarious.	So,	it	seems	that	theories	do	not	take	into	
account	 the	 possible	 social	 (not	 to	mention	 the	 environ-
mental)	drawbacks	of	 international	trade.	So,	the	reshap-
ing	of	the	UK’s	commercial	relationship	with	the	EU	could,	
in	 theory,	 be	 linked	 to	 a  rethinking	 of	 the	 way	 how	 this	
relationship	could	(socially	and	environmentally)	be	better	
balanced.	
Final remarks
Naturally,	there	are	plenty	of	issues	Brexit	negotiations	
can	easily	be	derailed	by,	 like	the	rights	and	status	of	EU	
residents	in	Britain	and	vice versa,	the	permeability	of	bor-
ders	between	Ireland	and	Northern	Ireland,	and	first	and	
foremost	the	size	of	the	so-called	exit	bill	that	is	expected	
to	remain	a stumbling	block	for	months.	Areas	where	the	
Commission	 says	 “sufficient	progress”	needs	 to	be	made	
before	 talks	can	move	onto	a post-Brexit	 trade	deal.	The	
big	question	for	the	EU	remains	whether	it	is	worth	punish-
ing	 the	 UK?	 For	 what?	 For	 a  decision	 mixing	 tradition,	
a global	mindset,	anti-globalism,	anti-elitism,	and	a feeling	
of	 being	 abandoned?	 There	 are	 two	 reasons	 why	 such	
a  punishment	 would	 be	 counterproductive:	 first,	 the	 EU	
would,	 in	a number	of	 issues	 (e.g.	 trade	 in	goods,	 fishing	
quotas,	budgetary	contribution),	loose	at	least	as	much	in	
profit	or	jobs	as	the	UK;	second,	if	the	EU,	instead	of	seek-
ing	 for	 revenge,	 took	 a more	 generous	 attitude	 towards	
the	leaving	UK,	it	would	make	it	more	attractive	in	the	eye	
of	both	its	current	and	potential	member	states.	By	doing	
so,	Brussels	 could	 avoid	 a  situation	 in	which	 it	would	be	
seen	 to	 play	 the	 role	 of	 a modern	Hudson	 Lowe	 against	
Napoleon,	but	under	a reverse	angle.	
Figure 3
UK trade balance in goods and services, 1999 to 2015 (£Mn) 
-70000 
-60000 
-50000 
-40000 
-30000 
-20000 
-10000 
0 
10000 
20000 
30000 
40000 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
RoW EU 28 
Note: EU27 = EU28 minus the UK. RoW = Rest of the World.
Source: ONS, Who does the UK trade with? 21 February 2017, http://visual.ons.gov.uk/uk-trade-partners/ 
17Unia Europejska.pl Nr 2 (243) 2017
                    
*	Dr	Miklós	Somai,	Senior	Research	Fellow,	Institute	of	World	
Economics,	Centre	for	Economic	and	Regional	Studies	HAS.	E-mail:	
Somai.Miklos@krtk.mta.hu.
1	A paper	based	partly	on	the	author’s	lecture	“Challenges	and	
opportunities	 related	 to	 disintegration	 in	 the	 European	 Union”	
given	at	 the	 conference	 “European	Economic	 Integration	Theory	
Revisited	Workshop”	supported	by	 the	European	Association	 for	
Comparative	Economic	Studies,	held	at	the	University	of	Szeged,	
Faculty	 of	 Economics	 &	 Business	 Administration	 on	 23rd-24th	
March	2017,	Szeged,	Hungary;	and	partly	on	the	author’s	 lecture	
“Brexit	 as	 a  trigger	 for	 disintegration:	 background	 and	 conse-
quences”	 given	 at	 the	 Second	 World	 Congress	 of	 Comparative	
Economics	 «1917–2017:	 Revolution	 and	 Evolution	 in	 Economic	
Development»	held	at	the	HSE	Campus	in	St.	Petersburg,	Russia,	
on	15–17	June,	2017.
2	One	can	refer	here	e.g.	 to	 the	 inevitable	concession	about	
the	reduction	of	the	British	rebate	for	better	financing	the	Eastern	
enlargement	in	2005,	or	the	unequal	terms	of	membership	for	the	
East	European	countries	as	for	their	agricultural	quotas	in	2002,	or	
the	pressure	of	the	ECB	on	Greek	banks	in	the	run-up	to	the	adop-
tion	of	the	country’s	third	rescue	package	in	2015.
3	See	Legrain	 (2016).	As	an	 intermediate	stage	of	disintegra-
tion,	 Legrain	 describes	 the	 threat	 that	 nationalist	 anti-establish-
ment	parties,	playing	already	a direct	role	in	governance	in	eight	
member	 states	 (Dennison	and	Pardijs,	 2016),	might	 capture	 fur-
ther	governments.
4	 The	 weakness	 of	 Eurozone	 periphery	 holding	 the	 euro	 at	
a significantly	lower	exchange	rate	against	all	third	currencies	than	
the	Deutsche	Mark	 (DM)	would	have	as	a  free-standing	national	
currency	(the	DM	would	likely	be	as	strong	as	the	Swiss	franc),	the	
whole	euro-system	has	proven	to	be	a godsend	for	Germany	and	
for,	in	economic	policy	terms,	its	closest	followers	(i.e.	the	Nether-
lands	 and	 Austria,	 having	 traditionally	 been	 pegging	 their	 own	
currencies	 to	 the	DM).	On	 the	 other	 side	 of	 the	 coin,	 the	 same	
system	is	thus	a bane	to	the	periferial	countries	(France	included),	
having	 to	 suffer	 from	 the	 artificially	 boosted	 competitiveness	of	
the	German	manufacturing	industry	(Dobozi,	2017).
5	In	order	to	illustrate	the	above,	let	us	remind	ourselves,	first,	
that	the	way	the	European	leaders	handled	the	financial	crisis	 is	
partly	 explained	by	 the	existence	of	 a  “web of personal, business 
and political relationships, largely obscured from public view, that link 
Europe’s banking establishment with the political classes at national, 
regional and even local level”	 (Barber,	 2010);	 second,	 that	 those	
citizens	of	the	member	states	“who have deep economic and social 
ties with their counterparts across Europe and benefit from Europe 
materially and culturally account for no more than 10 to 15 per cent 
of the EU population”	(Fligstein,	2008,	referred	to	in	Webber,	2014).
6	 Byname	 of	 the	 Council	 for	 Mutual	 Economic	 Assistance	
(CMEA).
7	Polity-formation	was	seen	by	Rokkan	as	a continuous	fight	
between	forces	of	boundary	transcendence	versus	boundary	con-
trol.	His	basic	contention	may	be	reproduced	 in	that	as	external	
closure	 of	 boundaries	 leaves	 micro-players	 no	 option	 than	 to	
voice	 when	 dissatisfied,	 internal	 cohesion	 not	 only	 makes	 the	
option	of	exit	less	profitable,	but	also	enhances	external	consoli-
dation	(Vollaard,	2008,	p.	19).
8	 If	 there	were,	 in	 the	 Eurozone,	 a  democratic	 vote	 propor-
tional,	e.g.	to	member	states’	inhabitants,	France,	Italy	and	Spain	
together	 representing	more	 than	 51%	 of	 the	 zone’s	 population	
(Eurostat,	estimates	as	of	January	1st,	2016),	they	could	put	an	end	
to	austerity	and	vote	for	the	introduction	of	eurobonds.	
9	 Decreasing	by	 49,000	 to	 273,000	 annual	 net	migration	 fell	
below	300,000	for	the	first	time	during	the	12	months	to	the	end	
of	September	2016,	so	just	after	the	June	2016	vote	to	leave	the	EU	
(Hall	2017).
10	As	a matter	of	fact,	since	the	EU	referendum	on	23rd	June	
2016,	 analysts,	 experts	 and	 other	 consultants	 working	 at	 the	
boundaries	of	business,	politics,	media,	and	social	sciences	have	
constantly	been	hammering	that	Brexit	was	proposed	by	uncon-
scientious	liars,	voted	by	rural,	elderly,	relatively	less	qualified	(i.e.	
easily	 deceivable)	 ignorant	 people,	 and	 first	 of	 all	 would	 be	 an	
absolute	disaster	to	the	UK	if	it	came	true	(see	e.g.	the	open	letter	
of	Lord	Kerr	of	Kinlochard	et	al.,	2017).	
11	 See	UK	Prime	Minister	 Theresa	May’s	 so-called	 Lancester	
House	speech	in	early	2017,	threatening	to	transform	the	UK	eco-
nomic	modell	 in	order	 to	attract,	with	competitive	 tax	 rates,	 the	
world	best	companies	and	biggest	investors	in	case	of	a punitive	
deal	(May	2017).
12	 In	 2016,	 of	 all	 UK	 private	 sector	 businesses	 99.9%	 were	
small	or	medium-sized.	Their	combined	turnover	was	1.8	 trillion	
pounds,	respresenting	47%	of	all	private	sector	turnover,	and	they	
employed	 15.7	million	 people,	 accounting	 for	 60%	of	 all	 private	
sector	employment	(FSB	web).
13	 It	 is	 exacerbating	 to	 see	 that	 when	 this	 feeling	 of	 being	
abandoned	takes	hold	of	an	ever	growing	strata	of	society,	push-
ing	them	towards	the	so-called	populist	political	parties,	the	Euro-
pean	elite,	instead	of	going	to	the	roots	of	the	problems,	can	but	
propose	to	strengthen	education,	marketing,	i.e.	a better	orches-
tration	and	dissemination	of	mainstream	ideas,	so	a sort	of	brain-
washing	(see	e.g.	Globsec	Tatra	Summit	2016).	
14	 By	 assuming	 that	 fragmenting	 LCH’s	 (London	 Clearing	
House,	 the	 world’s	 biggest	 clearinghouse)	 pool	 of	 interest-rate	
derivatives	 would	 change	 the	 price	 of	 every	 swap	 –	 the	 most	
popular	type	of	contract	–	by	one	basis	point	(Hadfield,	2017).	
15	Such	a regime	allows	access	to	an	EU	member	state	from	
third	countries	if	the	supervision	of	the	third	country	is	deemed	by	
the	Commission	to	be	equivalent	to	that	of	the	EU.
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THE EURO INFLUENCE ON 
COMPANIES’ EXPORT ACTIVITY1
Grzegorz Tchorek*
Introduction 
Intuitively	 we	 are	 prone	 to	 think	 that	 exchange	 rate	
volatility	 and	 related	 risk	 are	 important	barriers	 in	doing	
international	business.	In	practice	and	empirics,	there	are	
no	convincing	proofs	that	this	is	true	–	the	relation	between	
exchange	 rate	 risk	 and	 trade	 is	 seen	 as	 non-existing	 or	
weak	and	 conditioned	by	many	other	 factors	 in	order	 to	
materialise	(Taglioni,	2002;	Auboin	and	Ruta,	2013;	Brzozo-
wski	and	Tchorek,	2017a)2.	
The	expectations	as	to	the	euro	impact	on	trade	were	
more	hopeful	and	the	reasons	were	related	to	the	long	his-
tory	of	 the	 European	 integration	 and	 its	 sustainability	 as	
well	as	creation	of	many	institutions	which	were	designed	
to	 govern	 monetary	 integration.	 The	 irrevocably	 fixed	
exchange	 rate	 and	 formation	 of	 a  big	 economic	 area	 as	
a driver	 for	exports	was	also	supported	by	 the	new	con-
cept	called	the	endogeneity of optimum currency area	condi-
tions.	 According	 to	 Rose’s	 (2000)	 research	 on	 monetary	
unification	and	trade	and	in	view	of	an	extraordinary	effect	
of	 more	 than	 200%,	 scientists	 started	 to	 think	 that	 one	
country	 does	 not	 have	 to	 fulfil	 traditional	 optimum	 cur-
rency	 area	 conditions	 (flexibility	 of	 labour,	 similarity	 of	
economic	structure,	business	cycle	synchronisation,	etc.)	in	
order	to	adopt	the	euro.	One	should	rather	join	the	euro	
first	 and	 then	 it	 would	 be	 easier	 to	 fulfil	 the	 criteria	
(because	of	transaction	cost	reduction	and	more	trade	and	
economic	 integration).	This	overoptimistic	view	accompa-
nied	the	final	phase	of	the	euro	introduction.	
Finally,	 initial	expectations	were	cooled	down	and	 the	
euro	effect,	after	almost	ten	years	of	this	currency	being	in	
circulation,	was	estimated	at	approximately	3–5%	(Bun	and	
Klaassen,	2007,	Baldwin	et	al.,	2008).	Different	methodol-
ogy	approaches,	samples	of	countries	and	examined	peri-
ods	resulted	in	some	research	even	questioning	a positive	
euro	effect	and	seeing	it	as	negative	(Havránek,	2010).	
General	consensus	implies	that	bilateral	trade	between	
member	 states	did	not	 increase	markedly	 after	 the	 euro	
introduction.	It	needs	to	be	borne	in	mind,	however,	that	
the	euro	effects	should	not	be	confined	solely	to	changes	
in	the	volume	of	trade.	The	absence	of	significant	changes	
in	 the	 total	 flow	 of	 trade	 does	 not	 preclude	 qualitative	
changes	 such	 as	 new	 products,	 their	 improved	 diversity	
and	quality	or	lower	prices	(Fontagné	et	al.,	2009;	Cieślik	et	
al.,	 2013).	 It	 means	 that	 no	 or	 small	 euro	 effect	 at	 the	
aggregate	 level	 could	be	accompanied	by	changes	at	 the	
micro	level	which	are	not	visible	in	general	data	because	of	
price	 compression	 due	 to	 the	 pro-competitive	 pressure	
ensuing	from	the	euro	introduction.	
Experiences of the euro area members
Based	on	the	literature,	we	can	formulate	the	following	
conclusions	related	to	the	euro	effect	understood	as	a fac-
tor	accelerating	trade,	mainly	exports3.	
Firstly, the	euro	effect	was	 lower	than	expected. After	
positive	expectations	as	to	the	endogeneity	phenomenon,	
studies	related	to	monetary	unions	around	the	world	(usu-
ally	non-euro	area	unions)	confirmed	an	important	role	of	
monetary	 unification	 for	 trade.	 Rose	 and	 Stanley	 (2005),	
using	studies	on	the	euro	area	and	other	currency	unions	
in	their	meta-analysis,	claimed	that	the	monetary	unifica-
tion	 effect	 on	 trade	 ranges	 between	 30	 and	 90%4.	 But	
based	on	a meta-analysis	using	more	up-to-date	research,	
Havránek	(2010)	advises	distinguishing	between	the	Rose	
Sandholtz,	W.,	 Sweet,	A.S.	 (eds.)	 (1998).	European integration and 
supranational governance.	OUP	Oxford.
SMMT	(2016).	Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT) – 
Written Evidence (FTG0009) to the UK Parliament,	31	October.
Somai,	M.	(2002).	Chances of the Hungarian Agriculture in the light of 
negotiations for EU-accession	(Doctoral	dissertation,	Szent	István	
University).
Somai,	M.	(2013).	EU-budget: less money, less Europe? The new MFF 
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(1),	pp.	13-21.
Somai,	M.,	Biedermann,	Z.	 (2016).	Brexit: Reasons and challenges.	
“Acta	Oeconomica”,	66(s1),	pp.	137-156.
TheCityUK	 (2016).	Key fact about UK financial and related services.	
March	 https://www.thecityuk.com/assets/2016/Reports-PDF/
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2016.pdf	
HM	Government	(2017).	The United Kingdom’s exit from and new part-
nership with the EU. White Paper	available	at	https://www.gov.uk/
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and-new-partnership-with-the-european-union-white-paper
Vollaard,	H.	 (2008).	A  theory of European disintegration [in]	Fourth 
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